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1  Introduction
In this note I reflect on the possibility of women as subjects with the capacity 
to renegotiate what Jacques Rancière calls the “distribution of the sensible”.1 
I, firstly, explain Rancière’s formulation of the distribution of the sensible and 
from there use some literary examples as a way of contemplating women’s 
subjectivity. In other words, it is through the analysis and reading of literature 
and some literary characters that I reflect on women as subjects with the 
capacity to break with expected roles and identifications. I refer to an example 
that Rancière himself uses, namely, that of Olympe de Gouges and also discuss 
a reading of the character of Lucy in JM Coetzee’s Disgrace as well as the 
character of Philida in Andrè P Brink’s novel Philida.2 The overall concern of 
the piece may be described as the contestation of the lines of sight and forms 
of speech determined by material and perceptible societal configurations.3 I 
contend that what is brought forth by a Rancièrian reading of events and texts 
are paradoxical, precarious subjectivities that blur the lines between inclusion 
and exclusion thereby opening up the possibility of different or alternative 
ways of being and living. The discussion that follows is a means of calling 
for a shift in focus when it comes to female political subjectivity or when it 
*  This note is based on a paper presented at a Feminist Theory Workshop held by the Department of 
Jurisprudence, University of Pretoria in August of this year  I would like to thank the participants for 
valuable comments and insights  I would also like to express my gratitude to the participants of the 
Department of Public Law reading group at Stellenbosch University for the meaningful and stimulating 
discussions on the work of Jacques Rancière
1 J Rancière Disagreement (1999) 29-31
2 J Rancière “Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?” (2004) 103 South Atlantic Quarterly 298-310; A 
de Boever “Feminism After Rancière: Women in JM Coetzee and Jeff Wall” (2011) 19 Transformations: 
Journal of Media and Culture <www Transformationsjournal org/ journal/issue_19/article_032 shtml> 
(accessed 14-06-2013); AP Brink Philida (2012)
3 It is important to mention that I do not refer directly to law as I am interested, for the purposes of 
this note, in the law as much as it forms part of what Rancière calls “the police order”  Law and legal 
institutions form part of enforcing a society’s “distribution of the sensible” which I explain below  A 
call for the redistribution of the sensible is therefore also a call for the interrogation of law’s complicity 
in determining acceptable forms of speech, drawing lines of sight and making assumptions about the 
capacities of subjects  I take my cue from Rancière here and his insistence on taking a broader view of 
the aesthetic  See for example JJ Tanke Jacques Rancière: An Introduction. Philosophy, Politics and 
Aesthetics (2011) 73-108 for an explanation of Rancière’s approach to the aesthetic regime
       
comes to thinking about women in the current post-apartheid context.4 The 
suggestion is a refocus from political ends and concrete results to moments 
within which the renegotiation of our sensible world takes place.5 
2  The police order and the distribution of the sensible
In his most influential book, Disagreement, Rancière states:
“Politics is generally seen as a set of procedures whereby aggregation and consent of collectivities 
is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles and the systems for 
legitimizing this distribution. I propose to give this system of distribution and legitimization another 
name. I propose to call it the police.”6
Rancière is describing mainstream politics here or politics as we have 
come to know it, namely, the hierarchal administration of society that 
governs its citizens in the name of welfare.7 The actions of parliaments and 
assemblies, the decisions of courts, the work of politicians and bureaucratic 
efforts, Rancière classifies under the non-political heading of “the police”, 
“policing” or “the police order”.8 The police order does not only refer to state 
institutions, but also includes private institutions and an array of social and 
cultural practices and arrangements. Rancière demonstrates the link between 
his use of the term police and the work of Foucault in order to explain the 
broad nature of the term.9 He notes:
“[I]t is an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of 
saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task. It is an order 
of the visible and sayable.”10
An order of the visible and sayable connects with what Rancière calls 
“the distribution of the sensible” or la partage du sensible. Policing is the 
means by which a society enforces its distribution of the sensible.11 Policing 
denotes an ordering of the parts of society, an ordering “that invents a range of 
communicative and behavioural norms that is then distributed on the basis of 
a body’s nature, function and occupation”.12 It comes down to the perceptual 
configuration of society. What is sayable, what is visible, what is understood, 
who counts and who doesn’t? It is, more or less, our automatic perception of 
4 The South African context is marked by persisting violence against women and children and patriarchal 
attitudes and lines of thinking  I therefore believe that it is vital to ask questions revolving around the 
political appearance and subjectivity of women  It is from this perspective that I engage and reflect on 
women’s subjectivity and the renegotiation of sensible and aesthetic configurations
5 Tanke Jacques Rancière: An Introduction 49-50
6 Rancière Disagreement 28
7 T May “There are no Queers: Jacques Rancière and Post-Identity Politics” (2009) 8 Borderlands 3
8 SA Chambers “Jacques Rancière and the Problem of Pure Politics” (2011) 10 European Journal of 
Political Theory 306
9 Chambers (2011) European Journal of Political Theory 306  Foucault argues that the police includes 
everything to the extent that any police order determines hierarchal relationships between human beings 
as well as to the extent that it sets up relationships between men and things  It thus also constitutes a 
material order  See M Foucault Omnes et Singulatum’, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (1979) as 
referred to in Chambers (2011) European Journal of Political Theory 306
10 Rancière Disagreement 29
11 Tanke Jacques Rancière: An Introduction 45
12 E Stoneman “Appropriate Indecorum: Rhetoric and Aesthetics in the Political Theory of Jacques 
Rancière” (2011) 44 Philosophy and Rhetoric 143
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status, identity and entitlement. In this regard, the French formulation of the 
“distribution of the sensible” or le partage du sensible becomes helpful. The 
word partage has two elements or senses easily lost in the English translation. 
In the first sense it describes how partitions and divisions of the sensible 
structure what is seen and unseen, audible and inaudible, how certain objects 
and phenomena can be related or not, and also, who, at the level of subjectivity, 
can appear in certain times and places.13 It denotes the general distribution 
of bodies as well as an implicit estimation of what they are capable of. The 
second sense of partage indicates that these distributions are shared.14 It 
indicates a sharing of the sensible that refers itself to the principles and forms 
of relation that are part of the common world. It is therefore the parcelling out 
of spaces and times to create a shared world containing different allotments.15 
The sensible is important to Rancière. Its distinctions and divisions anticipate 
what is thinkable and possible.16 It provides a picture of the world of what 
can be conceived, discussed and disputed and what can be conceived in 
turn structures what presents itself as thought and as possibility for further 
thought.17 The sensible provides courses of action, forms of relation and 
what may be regarded as new thought for sensible configuration.18 The 
distribution of the sensible thus ultimately defines the field of possibility and 
impossibility.19 In French the word sense means at once sense, meaning and 
direction. To redistribute the sensible, therefore, brings into question both the 
obviousness of what can be perceived, thought and done and the distribution 
of those who are capable of perceiving and thinking as well as altering.20 
With his analysis of the distribution of the sensible Rancière is interested in 
the sense that is made of sense.21 The distribution of the sensible connotes 
the meanings that are made of what appears to our senses.22 The task of 
politics is that of instituting breaches so that other meanings and directions 
are created.23 The police order, thus, as the overall name for the distribution of 
the sensible concerns the material ground of communicability, intelligibility 
and sensibility and if the police order is concerned with titles and roles, 
with identification and classification, politics is concerned with breaking the 
established framework of distribution:
“I propose to reserve the term politics for an extremely determined activity antagonistic to policing: 
whatever breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined 
by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration – that of the part that has no 
part … political activity is always a mode of expression that undoes the perceptible divisions of the 
13 Tanke Jacques Rancière: An Introduction 2
14 2
15 2
16 2
17 2-3
18 2-3
19 2-3
20 K Sellberg “Sublime Gender Transposition: The Reformed Platonism of Jacques Rancière’s 
Aesthetics as Queer Performance” (2011) 19 Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture <www
transformationsjournal or/journal/isse_19/article_032 shtml> (accessed 14-06-2013)
21 Tanke Jacques Rancière: An Introduction 2
22 2
23 2
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police order by implementing a basically heterogeneous assumption … an assumption that at the end 
of the day, itself demonstrates the sheer contingency of the order, the equality of any speaking being 
with any other speaking being.”24
Politics is, according to Rancière, the contestation of our sensible world.25 It 
concerns breaching the distribution of the sensible. It is important to mention, 
however, that not all breaches of the distribution of the sensible are politics. 
This term is reserved for actions, speech situations, manifestation, practices, 
arguments and even works of art and literature that inscribe equality into 
a police situation of inequality.26 Politics entails the enactment or the 
presupposing of equality through the staging of what Rancière calls a “scene 
of dissensus” within the police divisions of inequality.27 It is the process 
whereby two heterogeneous worlds can meet, the sensible world of the police 
order and the equality of anyone with everyone, or, the equality of speaking 
beings.28 It is dissensual activity of acting as if one were equal in a context 
of police inequality. By invoking the equality of everyone with anyone, the 
contingency of hierarchal societal orders is laid bare. It is important to note 
here that police inequality only appears or becomes perceptible once it is 
confronted with the logic of equality in a specific situation or context. The 
meeting of two logics, of equality with inequality, might be best illustrated 
with the example of Olympe de Gouges that Rancière discusses.
3  Olympe de Gouges
De Gouges stated famously during the French Revolution that if women 
were entitled to go to the scaffold, they were entitled to go to the assembly.29 
Equal-born women were not equal born citizens because they could not fit 
the purity of political life. Women belonged to the domesticated, private life 
and the common good had to be kept apart from the activities, feelings and 
interests of the private life.30 De Gouges’ point was that if women could lose 
their lives, sentenced to death as enemies of the state out of public judgment 
based on political reasons, then their private life (their life doomed to death) 
was political. De Gouges is the author of the text The Declaration of the Rights 
of Women and the Female Citizen. Rancière states:
“If, under the guillotine, they were as equal, so to speak, ‘as men,’ they had the right to the whole of 
equality, including equal participation to political life.”31
24 Rancière Disagreement 29-30
25 Tanke Jacques Rancière: An Introduction 49-50
26 51
27 Rancière (2004) South Atlantic Quarterly 303-304
28 Rancière states:
“There is an order in society because some people command and others obey, but in order to obey an 
order at least two things are required: you must understand the order and you must understand that 
you must obey it  And to do that, you must already be the equal of the person who is ordering you ” 
Rancière Disagreement 16
According to this formulation, equality must be presupposed on the basis of the equality of anyone 
capable of hearing and understanding an order  It is a presupposition that belongs to anyone who decides 
to assert themselves in the name of their own equality  See Rancière Disagreement 16
29 Rancière (2004) The South Atlantic Quarterly 303
30 303-304
31 304
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He further explains that the lawmakers of that time could of course not even 
hear this. Nevertheless, it could be enacted in the construction of a scene of 
dissensus. Rancière states:
“A dissensus is not a conflict of interests, opinions, or values; it is a division put in the ‘common 
sense’: a dispute about what is given, about the frame in which we see something as given … This is 
what I call dissensus: putting two worlds in one and the same world.”32
A political subject for Rancière is a subject with the capacity to stage a 
scene of dissensus.33
As a woman De Gouges had no qualification to make the claims that she 
did. Yet, she did. Acting as if she were equal to men, De Gouges becomes here 
the demos, representing the part that has no part according to the police order. 
By constructing a scene of dissensus (making political statements which she 
is not qualified to do and authoring the declaration) she challenges the overall 
distribution of the sensible, the distribution of roles, places and tasks. She puts 
together what Rancière calls “a relation of inclusion and exclusion”.34 She is 
excluded from political participation, but yet included as she can lose her life 
on political grounds. De Gouges is not making a mere claim for inclusion here, 
but rather embodies the contradictions of the police order arrangements that 
exclude her. This is where the difference lies in the Rancièrian sense; politics 
happens when a subject emerges through the meeting of two logics, the logic 
of the police with the logic of equality. Politics is not the mere inclusion into 
the police order, but that which disrupts the police order, that which puts the 
order into question; that which illuminates its contingency and opens up the 
possibility of reconfiguring the order itself.
Further, in this formulation De Gouges emerges as a paradoxical, 
precarious capacity or subjectivity. Although she makes her claim under 
the heading of “woman” and she does this as a woman and to the ends of 
women, this “identity” operates on two different levels: woman is both 
associated with the police order that she is challenging and also with the 
position that marks this challenge.35 It is associated with both the distribution 
of the sensible and also with its redistribution. It is associated with the world 
where women are not qualified to participate in politics and where there 
are roles and tasks and places designated to them and the world where they 
are equal. The demonstration still operates on the basis of the equality of 
speaking beings, albeit the equality of women as speaking beings. What is 
politically relevant in Rancièrian terms is the presupposition of equality in a 
scene of dissensus that undercuts police categories.36 De Gouges disidentifies 
herself with the category of woman as understood and seen within the police 
order, namely, a privatised, non-political designation (distancing herself 
from this social category) and appears through the process of what Rancière 
32 304
33 304
34 304
35 De Boever (2011) Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture Rancière’s Political Subject
36 See for example May (2009) Borderlands 14-15 for a discussion on identity and the presuppositional 
nature of equality
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calls “subjectification” as a new category of woman, one who has the right 
to politically participate.37 De Gouges becomes here representative of the 
equality of speaking beings, challenging her non-political designation as a 
woman by making political claims to the ends of a new designation of the 
female. It is in speaking in a radical form of equality that the possibility of the 
reconfiguration of the sensible distribution is disclosed.
4  Lucy’s renegotiation
In his essay “Feminism After Ranciere: Women in J.M. Coetzee and Jeff 
Wall”, Arne de Boever has noted that Rancière’s political subject appears 
to be precariously situated at the uneasy border between the empty and the 
specific.38 De Boever works with Gabriel Rockhill’s definition of Rancière’s 
political subject:
“[N]either a political lobby nor an individual who seeks adequate representation for his or her 
interests and ideas. It is an empty operator that produces cases of political dispute by challenging the 
established framework of identification and classification.”39
De Boever refers to JM Coetzee’s Disgrace and the disagreement that 
develops between the character of Lucy and her father after she had been 
horrifically attacked and raped in the farmhouse they were both living in at 
the time. David Lurie, Lucy’s father, was also brutally attacked. Lurie wants 
to call the police and press charges after what happened. Lucy agrees on the 
condition that he sticks to the story of what happened to him; she will tell what 
happened to her. When the police take their testimonies, Lucy does not talk 
about the rape. This angers and confuses her father and he puts questions to 
her as gently as he can. She, however, responds sharply:
“This has nothing to do with you, David. You want to know why I have not laid charge with the police. 
I will tell you, as long as you agree not to raise the subject again. The reason is that, as far as I am 
concerned, what happened to me is purely a private matter. In another time, in another place, it might 
be held as a public matter. But in this place, at this time, it is not. It is my business, mine alone.”40
In the context of De Gouges, whose actions reconfigure the lines drawn 
between the public and the private and the association of the former with 
men and the latter with women, Lucy’s statement, as De Boever notes, might 
strike one as profoundly conservative.41 It seems like she affirms women’s 
37 Subjectification refers to “[t]he production through a series of actions of a body and a capacity for 
enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field of experience, whose identification is thus 
part of the reconfiguring of the field of experience”  Rancière Disagreement 35  Subjectification therefore 
requires the disidentification with a police order imposed category and the subsequent identification 
with a part that is in excess to the already existing social parts within the police order  It refers to 
the declassifying of social groups or parts associated with the categories of the police  Politics in the 
Rancièrian sense rejects the hierarchies and social designations of the police order, not in the name of 
particular identities, such as blackness or the feminine, but in the name of the equality of speaking beings  
It confronts the police with what is foreign to it  See for example May (2009) Borderlands 7-12 for a more 
thorough discussion of the process of subjectification
38 De Boever (2011) Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture Rancière’s Political Subject  
39 G Rockhill “Glossary of Technical Terms” in J Rancière The Politics of Aesthetics (2004) 90
40 JM Coetzee Disgrace (1999) 112 as cited by De Boever (2011) Transformations: Journal of Media and 
Culture Lucy’s Politics  
41 De Boever (2011) Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture Lucy’s Politics  
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association with the private life. One has to consider, however, that the novel is 
written in the context of the South African Truth and Reconciliation processes 
which established a culture of confession.42 Within this culture of confession, 
of opening up, of lying bare and making public, Lucy insists on women’s 
association with the private. Later in the novel she tells her father, after he 
reproached her again for not laying charges against the rapists:
“This is my life. I am the one who has to live here. What happened to me is my business, mine alone, 
not yours, and if there is one right I have it is the right not to be put on trial like this, not to have to 
justify myself – not to you, not to anyone else.”43
Lucy therefore disclaims the right she has. In a culture or sensible 
distribution of confession, she chooses non-confession. If we evoke De 
Gouges again, and the long history of women’s exclusion from the political 
life, Lucy turns women’s association with private life into a revolutionary 
position. She challenges, as De Boever describes, several distributions of the 
sensible that are at work in Coetzee’s novel. She also challenges the historical 
context in which the novel is situated, specifically, the aftermath of apartheid 
and the problematic and complicated relations between black and white within 
this context.44 Lucy announces that she will continue to live on the farm 
where the attack took place. Her decision becomes extremely difficult for her 
father to understand, especially after Lucy’s black assistant Petrus becomes 
the co-proprietor of Lucy’s farm through a land transfer that aims to restore 
land to the native South African black population. Lucy stays on, deciding to 
become a bywoner (a poor tenant labourer who works for the landowner, but 
is also allowed to make some profit for him or herself). In order to give Lucy 
some protection, Petrus asks, via Lurie, to marry her. To her father’s surprise 
she accepts the proposal. She explains that he is not offering her “a church 
wedding followed by a honeymoon on the Wildcoast”, but rather “an alliance, 
a deal. I contribute from the land in return for which I am allowed to creep 
under his wing. Otherwise, he wants to remind me, I am without protection, I 
am fair game”.45 De Boever notes:
“What Lucy thus realises is the ‘impossible’ community of a white, lesbian woman living under a 
black man’s wing/ of a black man taking a white lesbian woman under his wing. It is neither the future 
for South Africa that her father imagined, nor the one that Petrus imagined. Her position marks instead 
the country’s radically ‘democratic’ future: a future that would lie beyond the established framework 
of identification and classification – race (black/white), gender (male/female), class (owner/tenant), 
and sexuality (straight/gay) – in which South Africa, from Lucy’s perspective, is caught up. It is in this 
sense that Lucy begins to appear as the representative of what Rancière calls ‘the part of those who 
have no part’: the political subject of a wrong, staging a scene of dissensus from where other ways of 
living together can become possible.”46
Disgrace also realises this particular politics at the level of the novel’s 
aesthetic. Spivak has noted that the novel is focalised “relentlessly”, as she 
42 Lucy’s Politics  
43 Coetzee Disgrace 133
44 De Boever (2011) Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture Lucy’s Politics  
45 Coetzee Disgrace 203
46 De Boever (2011) Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture Lucy’s Politics  
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puts it, through David Lurie. Spivak draws an important conclusion about the 
aesthetic:
“The reader is provoked for he or she does not want to share in Lurie-the-chief-focaliser’s inability 
to ‘read’ Lucy as patient and agent. No reader is content with acting out the failure of reading … 
This provocation is the ‘political’ in political fiction, the transformation of a tendency into crisis.”47
It is precisely then Lucy’s internally excluded position that becomes 
Disgrace’s aesthetic. As De Boever notes, the novel focuses through Lurie, 
provoking the reader to counter-focalise and take up Lucy’s cause.48 While 
Lucy is thus, according to De Boever, the empty operator, her emptiness 
“resists”, making its own disappearance impossible.49 It is Lucy’s insistence 
on distributing “otherwise” in this specific material and spatio-temporal 
context that allows for alternative capacities, possibilities and ways of being.
5  Concluding remarks
In Andre P Brink’s novel Philida, Philida is a young, coloured slave woman 
in the Cape living on the farm, Zandvliet, in 1832.50 She walks to the town 
of Stellenbosch in order to lodge a complaint at the Slave Protector’s Office. 
She aims to lodge the complaint against the farm owner’s son, Francois Brink, 
with whom she had four children. Brink promised her that if she “laid” with 
him, he would buy her freedom from the Government someday. Instead, 
Brink is marrying a white woman and Philida is to be sold to a neighbouring 
farm. Beaten, tortured and raped in her short life on the farm, it is still her 
home and she refuses to leave.
In one part of the novel Francois, who truly seems to care for Philida in 
his own way, but who obeys his father above all else, recalls how they would 
sneak into a certain room where a Bible was kept with all the Brink family 
names written in it. Frans states:
“And that was where Philida became a real pest. She kept on saying she also wanted to get into the 
Book. The more I told her it was a book for white people only, the more she kept on: ‘It’s just a lot of 
names, Frans, it says nothing about white people and slaves.’ Philida, it doesn’t work like that, there’s 
nothing you or I can change about it, it is just the way the world is. ‘Then we got to change the way of 
the world.’ … No, I keep telling her, some things cannot be changed from the way the Lordgod made 
them. ‘Then we got to start with changing the Lordgod’, she says. … ‘I tell you I want to be in that 
Book.’ … I am telling you, Philida, I keep insisting, it can’t be done and it won’t be done, and that’s 
the way it is. … ‘Then give me the pen.’”51
One might say that Frans accepts the given, the way things are. “It is just 
the way the world is”. Philida puts into question the rules of the Lordgod and 
the distribution of the sensible. She bore Frans’ children and she wants her 
name and the names of their children written in the Bible. “If you can’t or 
won’t do it, I’ll do it myself”. She presupposes her equality (“[i]t is just a lot 
of names Frans, it doesn’t say anything about whites and slaves”) and dares to 
47 GC Spivak “Ethics and Politics in Tagore, Coetzee and Certain Scenes of Teaching” (2002) 32 Diacritics 
22  
48 De Boever (2011) Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture Lucy’s Politics
49 Lucy’s Politics  
50 Brink Philida
51 37
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imagine another distribution of the sensible or rather a redistribution. She acts 
“as if”, straying from her “natural” allotment in order to inhabit a new body, 
one whose name is equally inscribed. The metaphor that Rancière uses for his 
politics is indeed theatre, staging a scene of dissensus, presupposing equality, 
creating equality where there is none. Here another example that De Boever 
refers to should be invoked. In the closing paragraph of her book Antigone’s 
Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death, Butler’s formulation of the scene 
almost reads like a summary of Rancière’s political subject and I therefore 
quote her at length:
“Who then is Antigone within such a scene, and what are we to make of her words, words that 
become dramatic events, performative acts? She is not of the human but speaks in its language. 
Prohibited from action, she nevertheless acts, and her act is hardly a simple assimilation to an existing 
norm. And in acting, as one who has no right to act, she upsets the vocabulary of kinship that is a 
precondition for the human, implicitly raising the question for us of what those preconditions really 
must be. She speaks within the language of entitlement from which she is excluded, particularly in the 
language of the claim with which no final identification is possible. If she is human, then the human 
has entered into catachresis: we no longer know its proper usage. And to the extent that she occupies 
the language that can never belong to her she functions as chiasm within the vocabulary of political 
norms. If kinship is the precondition of the human, then Antigone is the occasion for a new field of 
human, achieved through political catachresis, the one that happens when the less than human speaks 
as human, when gender is displaced, and kinship founders on its own founding laws. She acts, she 
speaks she becomes one for whom the speech act is a fatal crime, but this fatality exceeds her life 
and enters the discourse of intelligibility as its own promising fatality, the social form of its aberrant, 
unprecedented future.”52
Politics in the Rancièrian sense is an aesthetic operation of world-
disclosure.53 What was once obscured is made manifest and every 
reconfiguration of the sensible is a reconfiguration of what is possible. His 
politics can be described as an invitation to divide and distribute otherwise 
and actively question the frame in which we see things as given in an attempt 
to recast and reconfigure symbolic and sensible orders. And what is the fate of 
De Gouges’ or Lucy’s or even Antigone’s redistribution?
“Will the equality that it envisions ever be realised? Or is politics doomed to indefinitely 
redistribute? Perhaps these are simply the wrong questions. The point may be, rather, to act 
from the assumption of equality: to take serious the equality that, at various point in history, has 
been declared, and to act relentlessly from within the sensible mode of being that challenges the 
distribution of the sensible.”54
This challenge might be marked by acting “as if” and by thinking two 
worlds into one: the logic of the world of Frans’ Lordgod and the logic of 
the world where Philida’s name is written in a book thereby precariously 
contesting the lines of sensible intelligibility.
52 J Butler Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death (2000) 82 as cited in De Boever (2011) 
Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture Feminism After Rancière
53 Stoneman (2011) Philosophy and Rhetoric 146
54 De Boever (2011) Transformations: Journal of Media and Culture The Politics of Photography  
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SUMMARY
In this note, the author reflects on the subjectivity of women through the lens of Jacques Rancière’s 
formulation of the “distribution of the sensible”. The author discusses the French revolutionary 
woman, Olympe de Gouges, a reading of the character of Lucy in JM Coetzee’s Disgrace as well as 
the character of Philida in Andre P Brink’s work Philida. These characters and events are analysed 
as a way of calling for the interrogation of orders of sensibility, intelligibility and communicability. 
It is suggested that a Rancièrian reading of characters and events discloses paradoxical, precarious 
subjectivities that renegotiate material and sensible contexts. The concern of the piece lies with the 
capacity and subjectivity to break with established roles and identifications and by assuming equality 
in order to recast conservative symbolic orders thereby opening up the possibility of alternative 
spaces, capacities and ways of being. The author suggests refocusing from political ends and results to 
moments within which the sensible is redistributed.
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